Compare SEC Filings in Seconds with Kilby
We released the portfolio ideas generation tool within Kilby. We also just released the below comparison function.
My Prompt to Kilby: “Compare the MD&A sections of the 2 attached 10K filings for Nvidia.”
Kilby’s response:
Here’s a direct comparison of the MD&A sections from both filings (FY2026 ended Jan 25, 2026 vs. FY2025 ended Jan 26, 2025):
Revenue Performance
FY2026 (from NVDA 10K 01252026.pdf, p. 37): Revenue hit $215.9B, up 65% YoY. Data Center up 68%, Gaming up 41%, Professional Visualization up 70%, Automotive up 39. Every segment accelerated.
FY2025 (from NVDA 10K 01262025.pdf, p. 38): Revenue was $130.5B, up 114% YoY. Data Center up 142%, driven by Hopper architecture for LLMs and generative AI. Gaming up only 9%. A much more concentrated growth story — Data Center did the heavy lifting while everything else was relatively flat.
The shift: FY2025 was a Data Center monoculture story. FY2026 broadened meaningfully — Gaming, ProViz, and Auto all put up strong numbers alongside continued Data Center dominance.
Architecture Transition
FY2025 MD&A: Hopper drove the full year; Blackwell only started shipping in Q4 FY2025.
FY2026 MD&A: Blackwell became the majority of Data Center revenue. Management highlighted the Blackwell transition as complex — product transitions and sophisticated system configurations introduced risk of delays, revenue volatility, inventory provisions, and warranty costs. They also flagged Rubin (next platform) with production shipments expected in H2 FY2027.
Gross Margin
FY2025: 75.0%, up 2.3 pts — driven by higher Data Center revenue mix.
FY2026: 71.1%, down 3.9 pts — the Hopper→Blackwell transition compressed margins as the company moved from selling HGX systems to full-scale datacenter solutions. A $4.5B H20 inventory charge hit the first quarter hard and was a primary drag.
The H20 / China Export Control Issue
This is a major new element in the FY2026 MD&A that was absent from FY2025. In April 2025, the USG required licenses for H20 exports to China and D:5 countries. NVIDIA took a $4.5B charge in Q1 FY2026. By the end of FY2026, management stated plainly that they were “effectively foreclosed from competing in China’s data center computing/compute market.” The FY2026 MD&A also flagged the Mellanox antitrust investigation in China, potential financial penalties, and the pending replacement rule for the AI Diffusion IFR.
FY2025 MD&A addressed export controls but with a different posture — the AI Diffusion IFR had just been published (Jan 15, 2025), its implications were forward-looking, and H20 was still being sold into China. The tone was cautionary but not yet describing a foreclosure.
Operating Expenses
FY2025: Opex $16.4B, up 45% — compensation, compute infrastructure, and new product engineering costs drove the increase.
FY2026: Opex $23.1B, up 41% — same drivers. R&D hit $18.5B (up 43%), with a 79% increase in compute and infrastructure costs specifically called out. SG&A up 31%.
Cash Flow and Liquidity
FY2025: Operating cash flow $64.1B; cash/securities $43.2B.
FY2026: Operating cash flow $102.7B — a significant jump driven by higher revenue. Cash/securities grew to $62.6B. Investing activity surged to ($52.2B), driven by $17.5B in private company/fund investments and the $13B Groq license deal. The Groq transaction (Dec 2025) — a non-exclusive license for LPU technology, $17B total consideration, $14.4B goodwill recorded — is a major new item with zero parallel in the FY2025 MD&A.
Capital Return
FY2025: $34.0B in buybacks; $834M dividends.
FY2026: $40.4B in buybacks; $974M dividends. Board approved a new $60B repurchase authorization in Aug 2025.
Structural Shifts in Tone and Risk Focus
The FY2025 MD&A was structured around three discrete challenge buckets: demand/supply complexity (Blackwell ramp), global trade (export controls as a forward risk), and macroeconomic factors. The narrative was optimistic — Blackwell was arriving, China was still a revenue contributor, and the AI Diffusion IFR was speculative.
The FY2026 MD&A is materially more sober in two areas: (1) China is now a lost market, with specific language about “effective foreclosure” and competitive harm to rivals benefiting from NVIDIA’s absence; and (2) the investment portfolio risk is substantially larger — $17.5B in illiquid private investments, $3.5B in facility lease guarantees, $11.4B in investment commitments, and a pending OpenAI deal. Management acknowledged these carry real downside if early-stage portfolio companies fail.
One Item to Flag
The FY2026 goodwill balance jumped from $5.2B to $20.8B — almost entirely due to the Groq license deal. That’s $14.4B of goodwill from a non-exclusive IP license where NVIDIA hired some employees but acquired no customer contracts or equity. The auditor flagged inventory valuation as the critical audit matter in both years, but the Groq structure — and the aggressive goodwill accounting — is worth watching. It uses a “cost to recreate” methodology which involves inherently unobservable inputs.